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Corporate Charitable Contributions:
Expanding the Judicial Analysis in a Post-Economic
Recovery Act World
The Economic Recovery Act of 19811 reflects many significant changes
in tax policy. In particular, the Act has several provisions which repre-
sent a policy shift in the area of charitable contributions. Major revisions
were made in those sections of the Internal Revenue Service Code deal-
ing with charitable contributions by individuals,2 private foundations' and
corporations.4 It was not coincidental that these changes accompanied con-
' Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2 I.R.C. § 170(i) (Supp. V 1981) (amending I.R.C. § 170 to permit a charitable deduction
for individuals who do not itemize). Of all the amendments affecting charitable deductions,
this section has had the most colorful history, having been proposed but rejected in two
previous sessions of Congress. See 127 CONG. REC. S343 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981). Senator
Moynihan, the amendment's sponsor, advocated the enactment of this provision primarily
because of the prospect that "contributions to charities will increase greatly." Id. at S7961.
He quoted estimates indicating that had this deduction been available in 1975, charitable
contributions would have increased by over three billion dollars. See id. at S7960-64. See
also Salamon, Will The Tax Act Hurt Giving?, 120 TR. & EST. 8 (Dec. 1981); Smith, Above-
The-Line Tax Treatmentfor Charitable Contributions, PHnANTHROPY MONTHLY, Sept. 25,1980,
at 34.
I.R.C. § 4942(d), (j) (Supp. V 1981) (amending the definition of a private foundation's
distributable amount, and the definition of an operating foundation). As a result of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, PuB. L. No.91-172,83 Stat. 487, I.R.C. § 4942(d) required foundations
to distribute for charitable purposes five percent of the foundation's net worth, or the
foundation's entire net investment income, whichever was greater. This system was begin-
ning to erode the giving efficiency of private foundations because of the combined effects
of inflation and the requirement to distrbuite all investment income. See generally William-
son, Foundations and the Payout Requirement, FOUND. NEWS, Mar.-Apr., 1981. In order to
preserve the foundation's charitable reserves, Congress amended S 4942(d) to require only
that private foundations distribute five percent of their net assets, leaving the rest to
be reinvested in the foundation. See 127 CONG. REC. E190-91, E334 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1981)
(comments of Reps. Conable and Frenzel); id. at S1365-66 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1981) (com-
ments of Sen. Moynihan); id. at S8280-83 (daily ed. July 23, 1981) (comments of Sens.
Durenberger and Moynihan). Thus, the thrust of the newly amended § 4942(d) is to in-
crease future charitable contributions of private foundations.
I.R.C. § 170bX2), (e4) (Supp. V 1981) (amending statute to increase charitable allowance
for corporations from 5% to 10%, and adding provision to allow certain corporations to
increase deductions for contributions of inventory property). While this note focuses on
the § 170(b)(2), 10% deduction allowance, the same policy underlies both § 170(b2) and
§ 170(e)(4). That policy, as stated on the floor of the Senate, is to "bring the corporations
of this country into the process of meeting the needs of the people of our society:' 127
CONG. REC. S8352 (daily ed. July 24,1981) (comments of Sen. Kennedy). The amended § 170(b2)
was intended to "facilitate that effort by raising the limit on corporation contributions
to charity." Id. Senator Byrd used slightly more emphatic language, stating, "I feel that
the corporations of our nation have an obligation.., to the various charities of our coun-
try, and I have felt for sometime that the 5 percent limitation was not a particularly
reasonable one:' Id. at S8353.
In the House, Representative Archer was also adamant in his belief that there was a
need for increased corporate charitable activity. He felt that the necessity for increased
corporate contributions "should be obvious," and that the present law was unnecessarily
restrictive. Id. at E3088 (daily ed. June 22, 1981).
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gressional approval of massive federal budget reductions.5 Concern over
the decrease in government funding of nonprofit and social service
organizations caused many senators and congressmen to support leg-
islation encouraging increased voluntary support from the private, philan-
thropic sector.'
The revisions dealing with corporate charitable donations are perhaps
the most striking because they mark the first major statutory alteration
in that area for nearly five decades.7 From a judicial standpoint, those
provisions may also present the greatest challenge because courts have
not demonstrated a clearly articulated, uniform approach to resolving
disputes arising in the context of corporate charitable transfers. Rather,
the past decisions have evidenced an uneven and convoluted growth in
this area of the law.
8
In the first instance, the courts' inconsistency in this area may be
attributed to their inability to agree on whether they should apply the
same standard in section 170 charitable contribution cases as they routine-
' See id. at S344 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981) (comments of Sen. Moynihan) ("[W]e are witnessing
a generalized discontent with the vastness, waste, and unaccountability that characterize
much of the Government. Here, then is the larger argument for the incentives to private
giving .... "). See also id. at S8352 (daily ed. July 24, 1981) (comments of Sen. Kennedy);
President Reagan, Remarks to the National Alliance of Business, Oct. 5, 1981, reprinted
in FOUND. NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 3; Inaugural Address of President Ronald Reagan 3 (Jan.
20, 1981).
6 See 127 CONG. REC. S1876 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1981) (comments of Sen. Durenberger); See
generally id. at S7965-68 (daily ed. July 20, 1981) (reproduction of various newspaper articles);
Salamon, The Federal Government and the Non-Profit Sector: Implications of the Reagan Budget
Proposals, URB. INST. (1981) (special study predicting impact of the Reagan budget on non-
profit organizations). For an early review of potential problems with raising additional
charitable revenues, see Troyer, Tax Bill Reduces Incentives for Charitable Giving, LEGAL
TIMES OF WASHINGTON, Sept. 21, 1981, at 15.
' The percentage ceiling on corporate charitable deductions has remained unchanged
since Congress incorporated into the Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat.
1014 (adding subsection (r) to § 23), a provision allowing corporations to deduct up to five
percent of their pre-tax net income in charitable contributions. See infra note 31. In 1962
a "carry forward" feature was added to the Code, and in 1964 the carry forward period
was extended to five years. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19, 46, 5
170(d)(2) (former S 170(b)(3)) (permitting corporations to carry forward into the next taxable
year deductions in excess of the percentage limit). Section 170(d)(2) remains in effect for
the 10% limit, so that conceivably a corporation could deduct more than 10% of their pre-
tax net income in any given year. See source cited infra note 9.
1 See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 602 n.114 (1980) ("The
courts have not followed a consistent pattern in this area."); Dockery v. Commissioner,
T.C.M. (P-H) 78,063, at 321 (1978) ("As can be seen, the cases do not consistently apply
the same test.").
I.R.C. S 170 (1976). Section 170 reads in pertinent part:
(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION
(1) GENERAL RULE-There should be allowed as a deduction any
charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which
is made within the taxable year ....
(b) PERCENTAGE LIMITATIONS
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ly use under the section 102(a) ° gift analysis." A further complication
derives from the fact that those courts which have decided to adopt
different tax analyses for individual charitable contributions and gifts have
been unable to reach a consensus on whether the gift analysis is also
inappropriate when a business, as opposed to an individual, claims a
charitable deduction. 2 Ultimately, determining whether a given business
contribution is in fact charitable is an important question from a tax policy
(2) CORPORATIONS-In the case of a corporation, the total deductions under
subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed 10 percent of
the taxpayer's taxable income ....
(c) CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEFINED-For purposes of this section, the term
'charitable contribution' means a contribution or gift to or for the use of-
(1) A State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivi-
sion of any of the foregoing, or the United States or-,the District
of Columbia, but only if the contribution or gift is made for exclusively
public purposes.
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation ....
(d) CARRYOVERS OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS-
(2) CORPORATIONS-
(A) IN GENERAL-Any contribution made by a corporation in a tax-
able year (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as the "con-
tribution year") in excess of the amount deductible for such
year under subsection (b)(2) shall be deductible for each of the
5 succeeding taxable years in order of time ....
10 I.R.C. 102(a) (1976). Section 102(a) reads in pertinent part: "GENERAL RULE- Gross
income does not include the value of property acquired by gift . I..." d.
11 See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (W.D. Mich. 1978) ("Courts have
split on the appropriate test to be used in determining whether a particular transaction
was a 'contribution or gift."'); Morton v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 621, 625 (1979)
("Some years ago we commented that the term 'gift' as used in section 170, as reflected
in the decided cases, represented a 'thicket of subjective and occasionally ephemeral con-
cepts.' Later decisions have done little to cause us to change that description.") (citing
Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 311, 317 (1965); Marquis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
695, 702 (1968) ("Indeed ... the principles underlying the gift exclusion decisions may not
be fully applicable in the area of charitable contributions."). Compare Dowell v. United
States, 533 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977); Considine v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 955, 967
(1980); Rhodes v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 77,033, at 147, 151 (1978); Pettit v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 634, 639 (1974); Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 265, 275 (1971); DeJong v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C. 896, 899 (1961), affid, 309 F.2d 373, 376-79 (1962) (all cases applying
the § 102(a) gift standard in § 170 charitable contribution cases) with Allen v. United States,
541 F.2d 786, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1976); Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st
Cir. 1972); Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1970); Crosby Valve &
Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1967); Haak v. United States, 451
F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (all cases refusing to apply a gift analysis in charitable
contribution cases).
11 See United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968); Joshel
v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1961); Citizen & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States,
243 F. Supp. 900, 905-06 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422
(Ct. CI. 1971); Clayton v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 670, 710-11 (Aug. 13, 1981); Myers
v. United States, 1981-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9179 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Dockery v. Commis-
sioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 78,063, at 321-22 (1978).
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standpoint because it is another way of deciding whether the transfer
will be deductible from gross income.'3 With the amendment to section
170(b)(2),' 4 an overwhelming legislative endorsement of corporate
philanthropy, the issue of deductibility has become even more important.
This note focuses on the issue of corporate" charitable contributions.
Specifically, it will examine the standards or tests that have been used
by the courts in determining whether a transfer of assets by a corporate
or other business entity qualifies as a charitable contribution under sec-
tion 170. The newly amended section 170(b)(2) is designed to encourage
greater corporate charitable expenditures by allowing a larger charitable
deduction." This note argues that because corporations are so sensitive
to the cost of giving, 7 and the deduction allowance is so large," the courts'
determination of how much economic benefit a corporation may derive
from a charitable transfer will effect the long-term efficacy of the new
legislation." Ultimately, the note concludes that the standard currently
employed by the majority of courts is inappropriate," and offers a
preferable analysis. In order to understand the deficiency of the courts'
current section 170 analysis, some background on the historical develop-
ment of the relationship between a charitable contribution and a business
expenditure is presented."
13 The relationship between the tax test used to determine whether a contribution is
in fact charitable and the level of corporate charitable activity was noted over a decade
ago by Professor Blumberg, who wrote that "the tax test may . . . also be the decisive
test of validity in a tax-oriented business world. It is plain that as a practical matter, cor-
porate activities in the social sphere will be undertaken only if the expenditures are tax
deductible." Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility, 50 B.U.L. REV. 157, 180 (1970). See infra
note 57 and accompanying text.
.4 I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See source cited supra notes 4 & 9.
"S Most, if not all, of the discussion, however, applies to the general category of business
charitable contributions. The courts' discussion of the issue of charitable contributions in
a business context applies both to corporations and other business entities. See Southern
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 602 n.114 (1980).
11 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
1, See Butler, Philanthropy in America: The Need For Action, HERITAGE FOUND. (1981),
reprinted in 127 CONG. REC. S349-56 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981).
8 See infra note 35.
" See infra text accompanying notes 155-59. If the courts continue to apply an unnecessar-
ily restrictive analysis in business charitable contribution cases, it is unlikely that a major-
ity of corporations will be able to increase adequately their current level of contributions. Id.
11 There are two levels to this "appropriateness" inquiry: first, whether the standard
is appropriate, that is, defensible, in light of the history of corporate charitable activity;
and second, whether that standard is appropriate in light of the charitable contribution
policy incorporated in the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
While the two are analytically separable, under either inquiry the courts' analysis is
unacceptable.
21 One of this note's major criticisms of the courts' current business charitable contribu-
tion standards is that the analysis unduly restricts the definition of a charitable contribu-
tion so as to exclude certain economic benefits that from a historical perspective are en-
tirely acceptable. See infra text accompanying notes 22-54. The courts' restrictive analysis
seems unwarranted in light of the historical overlap in the function of the business charitable
contribution and the business expense. See infra text accompanying notes 55-83.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Early Case Development
The early case law in the area of corporate charitable donations focused
primarily on the question of whether a corporation was legally empowered
to make charitable contributions.' The earliest judicial analysis applied
in corporate contribution cases, the "strict constructionist" doctrine,2 was
not particularly conducive to gratuitous transfers. In 1917, however, the
courts replaced that approach with a less restrictive "benefit" standard,
which allowed donations that were consideration for a benefit flowing to
the corporation.24 In order for a corporate contribution to survive the
benefit analysis, the corporation had to demonstrate a relationship be-
tween the business of the corporation and the designated charity.25 Until
1924, the judicial decisions applying the benefit criteria arose exclusively
in the context of employee relations, not philanthropic concern.26 In these
cases it was generally not difficult for the courts to find the type of direct
benefit flowing to the corporation necessary to validate the expenditures:'
business judgment, not eleemosynary sentiment, provided the judicial
justification for distributions of corporate funds outside the immediate
profit-making sphere of activity."
2 See M.F. SMITH. PHILANTHROPY AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 6 (1972).
1 Blumberg, supra note 13, at 168. The strict constructionist approach was based on
a literal reading of the corporation's charter, which specified the type of business activity
the corporation was empowered to undertake. Corporate distributions that were found
to be outside the sphere of authorized authority were held to be ultra vires. Id. See, e.g.,
Brinson Ry. v. Exchange Bank, 16 Ga. App. 425, 85 S.E. 634 (1915); Davis v. Old Colony
R.R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881). Modern case law and enabling statutes have effectively eliminated
ultra vires attacks on corporate charitable distributions. See Garrett, Corporate Donations,
22 Bus. LAw. 297,297 (1967). There is still the possibility, however, that a charitable donation
authorized by a corporate officer would be in violation of his duty to act intra vires and
within his respective authority. See Comment, Corporate Conscience: Charitable Donations,
9 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 425 (1968).
" Blumberg, supra note 13, at 170. The court's formulation of this test in Chicago &
N.W.R.R. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 882,888 (7th Cir. 1940) is, a typical example: "Corpora-
tions are not entitled to deductions for charitable contributions, but.., they are author-
ized to take deductions for 'donations which legitimately represent a consideration for a
benefit flowing directly to the corporation as an incident to its business .... ' See also
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (1896).
Garrett, supra note 23, at 298.
Blumberg, supra note 13, at 170. Others have also agreed with this position. See F.
ANDREWS, CORPORATE GIVING 231-33 (1952 R. EELLS, CORPORATE GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY
6-8 (1956). See generally M.F. SMITH, supra note 22, at 9-13. Typically, these donations took
the form of contributions to employee relief funds or provided financing for the construc-
tion of libraries, homes, and other buildings in the immediate business community. Blumberg,
supra note 13, at 170.
1 See People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 A). 150, 153, 120 N.Y.S.
649, 651 (1909); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 719 (1896);
see generally Blumberg, supra note 13, at 170-72.
' Blumberg, supra note 13, at 170; but see Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co.,
285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922) (court refused to invalidate corporate contribution to an educa-
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The Nebraska Supreme Court in State ex rel. Sorenson v. Chicago, B.
& Q. Railroad 29 began to enlarge the benefit concept when it upheld a
railroad's practice of gratuitously providing ministers with free boarding
passes." Subsequent case development continued to give a more expansive
meaning to the term "direct" benefit, gradually eviscerating (but not ex-
pressly rejecting) the original requirement that the contribution produce
an immediate economic advantage for the corporation.3' The notion of
benefit was broadened to the point where "a contribution, not resulting
in immediate economic results, was made a matter of business judgment
to fulfill [some] objective." 2
Concurrently, attitudes about corporate responsibility began to evolve
into an expanded recognition of the corporation's role in society and its
fiduciary obligations to the general public.3" The visible shift toward an
acceptance of corporate activity in the public domain as a legitimate,
indeed, desirable exercise of corporate discretion was recognized by Con-
gress in the Revenue Act of 1935.' By amending the IRS Code to permit
corporations to deduct contributions not in excess of five percent of their
tional institution because it determined that the trained personnel made available by the
donation would benefit corporation). This is the first reported decision to stretch the meaning
of benefit so as to "disguise corporate philanthropy in terms of pretended self-interest."
Blumberg, supra note 13, at 171.
112 Neb. 248, 199 N.W. 534 (1924).
1 Id. at 250, 199 N.W. at 538; see also Carey v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 168 Okla.
487, 492, 33 P.2d 788, 794 (1934).
31 See Blumberg, supra note 13, at 176; but see Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helver-
ing, 293 U.S. 289 (1934) (denying a charitable deduction which the corporation had made
with the expectation of generating goodwill and increased business, because of the absence
of any direct economic benefit flowing to the corporation).
Blumberg, supra note 13, at 176.
z See, e.g., Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932). This article was the seminal work of the period. Dodd both predicted and advocated
an expanded notion of corporate "social responsibility" which went beyond single-minded
adherence to profit maximization. Id. at 1160-61. A lively debate ensued between Dodd
and Adolf Berle, who more narrowly viewed the corporation as being owned by shareholders
who had a legal right to control management and share in the profits. See Weiner, The
Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964). The
theoretical debate has continued ever since. See generally T. BRADSHAW. CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR CRITICS (1981); Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 51 B.U.L. REV. 425
(1971); Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Market: Shareholder Suffrage, Cor-
porate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 78 Wisc. L. REV. 391 (1978); Heather-
ton, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility,
21 STAN. L. REv. 248 (1969); Note, Corporate Charitable Donations: Shareholder Protection and
Public Disclosure, 5 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 99 (1969). As far as the courts are concerned,
the power of a corporation to engage in philanthropic activity has not been questioned
since A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A2d 581 (1953). See infra text accom-
panying notes 36-54; see also Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972);
Center on Corp. Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 874 n.21 (D.D.C. 1973).
Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 688 (1919); Miller v. Magline, Inc.,
76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977).
' The Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of I.R.C. (1939)).
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pre-tax net income, Congress implicitly validated the concept of a cor-
porate charitable donation. 5
It was, however, nearly two decades later before the narrow benefit
criteria articulated in the early decisions was formally rejected by the
courts. The landmark case of A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow,36 decided
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1953, was the first case to discard
"singleminded reliance on the ... benefit test."" The court in A.P. Smith
upheld the contribution of $1500 to a private educational institution as
a valid exercise of corporate prerogative.l The contribution was justified
on three separate bases: the donation reasonably furthered corporate in-
terests, which resulted in a benefit;39 a New Jersey statute expressly
authorized contributions;"0 and the corporation had a broad responsibility
to society.41 Despite the court's sweeping language on the merits and
necessity of corporate responsibility,42 the court's holding was somewhat
more limited. The court noted that the donation furthered a corporate,
not personal, end,4 3 that the amount was modest and within the statutory
prescription, and that the contribution was reasonably calculated to ad-
1IdL, 49 Stat. at 1016 (codified at I.R.C. § 23(r) (1939)) (adding subsection (r) to section
23 of the Code). One of the unanswered and intriguing questions surrounding the passage
of this amendment is why Congress chose the five percent figure. See Rudney, Tax Policies
Affecting Corporate Philanthropy, NAT'L CHAMBER FOUND., Oct. 31, 1977, at 14. One former
SEC attorney speculated that the federal government was allowing these charitable deduc-
tions rather begrudgingly, and that there was still a great deal of opposition, both in govern-
ment and in the courts, to the idea of philanthropy becoming a "significant portion" of
a corporation's budget. See Shakely, Exploring the Elusive World of Corporate Philanthropy,
GRANTSMANSHIP CENTER NEWS, July-Sept. 1977, at 38. He concluded by noting that "the IRS
is somewhat vague on what it means by 'significant', but more than 5 percent of net profits
has been seen as significant in other contexts. Perhaps it was here, too." Id. Rudney
acknowledges this possibility, but also surmises that the five percent limit may have been
intended to serve as a constraint on contributions by closely held corporations because
it was more advantageous for the controlling shareholder in a closely held corporation
to make contributions through the corporation rather than personally. Rudney, supra, at
14. Perhaps because of this, charitable contributions by a shareholder of closely held stock
have been carefully scrutinized. See Jones v. United States, 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976);
Kinsey v. Commissioner, 471 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973); Hudspeth v. United States, 447 F.2d
275 (8th Cir. 1972).
13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
Blumberg, supra note 13, at 167.
A.P. Smith, 13 N.J. at 160-61, 98 A.2d at 590. The court emphasized the fact that
most of the nation's wealth had been transferred into corporation coffers. This shift in
wealth, along with the increasing tax burdens on individuals, had created an obligation
for the corporations to "acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities
as members of the communities within which they operate." Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
Id at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
Id. at 156-60, 98 A.2d at 587-89.
Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
42 Id
Id. at 161, 98 A.2d at 590. But see Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d
398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (rejecting the inference in A.P. Smith that a gift which furthers
a personal end may be improper).
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vance the interests of the corporation."' Thus, the court's holding did not
totally remove either the language of, or the need for, some corporate
benefit in the contribution, although clearly the term was given a pro-
foundly new meaning."
Later, in Union Pacific Railroad v. Trustees, Inc.," the Utah Supreme
Court joined in what it considered the widespread acceptance of the con-
cept of corporate social responsibility, 47 by validating a $5000 corporate
contribution to a nonprofit organization.' The court did so, however, only
because it thought that corporate managers would never undertake a
contribution program unless they were confident that the company would
receive, either immediately or in the near future, some benefit which would
constitute a quid pro quo." Holding the donation permissible, the court
recognized an implied corporate power 0 to make contributions if they
were "of reasonable amounts ... [and] appear reasonably designed to
assure a present or foreseeable future benefit to the corporation .... ""
As in Smith, Union Pacific validated and encouraged corporate
charitable activity, but did not entirely remove the notion of business
benefit from judicial regulation of corporate charitable contributions.2
Rather, it expanded the definition of benefit to include not only those
corporate donations or transfers directly benefiting the corporation, but
also those legitimately furthering some business objective.' In both the
Smith and Union Pacific decisions the courts remained concerned that
the charitable transfer exhibit some business nexus. They did not overt-
ly distinguish a charitable contribution from a business expense because,
under their analysis, the power to make contributions still had to be ex-
ercised in the interests of the corporation. In short, there had to be "a
reasonable relationship between the activity and the fulfillment of the
objectives of the business. '
" A.P. Smith, 13 N.J. at 161, 98 A.2d at 590.
"s One critic comments that the "vague criteria of 'insuring and strengthening' society
was held [in A.P. Smith] to constitute a sufficient corporate benefit:' Note, supra note
33, at 105.
" 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1955).
' Id. at 105, 329 P.2d at 401.
Id. at 107, 329 P.2d at 402.
, Id. at 106, 329 P.2d at 401. But see Id. at 112, 329 P.2d at 405 (Worthen, J., dissenting)
(Chairman of Board of Union Pacific admitted in testimony that "[the corporation] cannot
seek always to put the gift on a quid pro quo basis").
I Id. at 103, 107, 329 P.2d at 399, 402. In this sense, the court's holding is broader than
that of A.P. Smith because in that case the court partially based its holding on the presence
of a New Jersey enabling statute. See supra text accompanying note 40.
51 Union Pacific, 8 Utah 2d at 107, 329 P.2d at 402. The court declared such a policy
of making contributions one of sound business. Id. at 106, 329 P.2d at 401. The challenging
party was assigned the burden of proving either waste or lack of a corporate benefit. Id.
I Id. at 107, 329 P.2d at 402. The court believed the decision to make a charitable con-
tribution should properly be left to the discretion of management, and should be made
with the "studied and not unreasonable conviction that it would benefit the corporation." Id.
Blumberg, supra note 13, at 176.
Id. There have been few recent cases in the area of corporate social responsibility.
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The Section 162(b) Limitation
The right of a business entity to engage in charitable activity has
remained essentially inviolate since the passage of the Revenue Act of
1935.1 The corollary question, however, of whether a particular transfer
qualifies as a charitable contribution for purposes of tax analysis, has not
enjoyed similar judicial unanimity.- As a practical matter, determining
whether a transfer is charitable in nature may be the more important
question because a court must decide whether a contribution is in fact
charitable before a deduction will be allowed.' Unfortunately, modern
courts have been unable to articulate a standard that adequately dis-
tinguishes a charitable donation from a business expense for purposes
of deductibility.
The problem of separating a business-oriented charitable donation from
In the only recent case of any significance, Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d
398 (Del. Ch. 1969), the court, while differing on at least one point with the decision in
A.P. Smith, see supra text accompanying note 43, upheld a corporate donation to a private
foundation in the face of shareholder disapproval. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,
257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969). In doing so, the court mentioned the responsibility of
corporations to support charitable causes, id. at 404, but also noted that the loss in im-
mediate income would be outweighed in the long run by the overall benefits flowing to
the corporation. Id. at 405. See also Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878 (Del.
1969) (upheld payment of five million dollars by corporation to county in Pennsylvania on
basis of business judgment rule, not reaching question of whether financial benefit to cor-
poration precludes treating payment as charitable contribution).
0 See Center on Corp. Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 874 n.21 (D.D.C.
1973) ("It is only reasonable that corporations begin to realize that they have duties beyond
simply making money for their shareholders .... [It is incumbent upon corporations to
use their substantial economic power for the community good, rather than solely for self-
enrichment ..... ) (emphasis in original); Manne, The Limits And Rationale Of Corporate
Altruism: An Individualistic Model, 59 VA. L. REv. 708, 722 (1973) ("Clearly what can pass
as corporate altruism must be near an all-time high today.").
" See infra notes 86 & 149 and accompanying text.
The vast majority of recent decisions dealing with the issue of whether a business
charitable deduction is legally permissible have arisen in the context of a transfer of some
property interest. In both of the major decisions in the area of corporate charitable transfers,
the courts' finding that the legal requirements for a § 170 charitable deduction had not
been met resulted in no deduction at all for the transferring corporation. See United States
v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d
413 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Moreover, courts will often classify a denied corporate charitable con-
tribution as a capital expenditure, which is a nondeductible expense under I.R.C. § 263
(1976). See Dockery v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 78,063, at 321 n.8 (1978). Even in those
situations where a denied charitable transfer might qualify for a § 162(a) business-expense
deduction, the disallowance of the charitable deduction could have a significant adverse
financial impact. This is especially true with respect to the transfer of appreciated capital
gain property. A judicial finding that a transfer of appreciated capital gain property did
not constitute a charitable contribution would trigger a tax on the long term capital gain
and reduce the benefit of the deduction. See STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 206.012 (1982);
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c) (1981). The corporation would no longer be able to deduct the
fair market value, but only the corporation's basis in the property. The corporation would
therefore pay a tax on the difference between the fair market value and the basis. The
risk of paying the additional capital gains tax is a powerful disincentive to potential cor-
porate charitable contributors.
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an ordinary business expenditure developed after the passage of the
Revenue Act of 1935.1 After 1935, corporations were able to circumvent
the five percent limitation on charitable contributions by claiming that
a transfer, although charitable in nature, actually represented considera-
tion for benefits flowing to the corporation or in some way benefited the
corporation and was thus tantamount to a business expense. 9 The fact
that courts were receptive to arguments of benefit and consideration in
the context of charitable contributions indicates the relative imprecision
with which those courts approached the distinction between a business
deduction and a charitable contribution.
6 0
In response to either the corporation's ingenuity or the judiciary's
apathy, Congress enacted section 23(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1938,"
which was incorporated virtually verbatim into the language of current
Code section 162(b).2 Congress was concerned with the fact that expend-
itures that were actually charitable in character were being deducted
under the guise of business-related expenses.' In passing what is now
section 162(b) of the Code, Congress intended that a wholly gratuitous
transfer, which generated no.benefit for the corporation, should constitute
a charitable contribution and be subject to the then current five percent
limit. Conversely, a transfer that contemplated a benefit flowing to the
corporation commensurate in value to the transferred interest was not
considered charitable, but rather a section 162(a)" business expense.
Congress' legislative distinction, however, was not exhaustive. Between
The Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014.
5 In Fairmont Cremery Corp. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1937), for exam-
ple, the court held that contributions by the corporation to a YMCA and a college pur-
suant to a solicitation by customers with whom it did considerable business were deducti-
ble as legitimately representing consideration for benefits flowing to the corporation.
I This imprecision reinforces the impression suggested earlier, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 49-51 that even after the passage of the 1935 enabling legislation charitable
contributions were routinely distributed in a business context, and that this practice did
not offend the courts' notion of corporate charity. See, e.g., Halst v. New York Stock Exch.,
252 A.D. 233, 299 N.Y.S. 255 (1937); People v. S.W. Strauss & Co., 158 Misc. 186, 285 N.Y.S.
648 (1936).
" The Revenue Act of 1938, PuB. L. No. 75-554,52 Stat. 447 (adding subsection (a)(2) to S 23).
62 Section 23(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1938, id., provided that "no [business] deduction
shall be allowable to a corporation for any contribution or gift which would be allowable
as a [charitable] deduction ... were it not for the 5 percent limitation therein contained."
Cf. I.R.C. S 162(b) (1976) ("No [business] deduction shall be allowed under section 162(a)
for any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduction under section 170
were it not for the percentage limitations . . . set forth in such section.").
See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 419 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Marquis v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 695, 699 (1968).
I.R.C. S 162(a) (1976) (allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses).
65 The congressional comment accompanying I.R.C. S 23(a)(2) (1954) stated, "As under
present law, [the limitation contained in S 23(a)] applies only to gifts, i.e. those contribu-
tions which were made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with the
amount of the gift .... H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A44 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1954).
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the polar points of no benefit and commensurate benefit there exist many
types of contributions or transfers which generate some benefit to the
corporation, albeit benefits which are not commensurate in value to the
contribution or transfer." Two important cases decided under section
162(b) have attempted to refine the distinction between a charitable
contribution and a business expenditure in these "gray-area" transfers.
The first, Marquis v. Commissioner,7 involved cash payments by a travel
agent to charities who were her clients. The issue was whether the
payments to qualified charitable organizations could be deducted as
business expenses without regard to the section 162(b) five percent limita-
tion on charitable donations.' The government argued that a contribu-
tion could not be deductible under 162(a) as a business expense, and
therefore could not avoid the section 162(b) restriction, unless there was
a direct and apparent quid pro quo-a binding obligation, anticipated in
advance of the exchange. 9 If none existed, then the payments necessari-
ly had to be considered a section 170 contribution and therefore subject
to section 162(b).70
After reviewing the legislative history, the United States Tax Court
rejected the government's intepretation"' and refused to apply the sec-
tion 162(b) limitation to the transfer. '2 The court held that the govern-
ment's "binding obligation" theory of section 162(b) was overly restric-
tive and inconsistent with the statute's intent,' thus indicating that some
voluntary or gratuitous transfers should not be properly characterized
as charitable deductions. The court cast its analysis in terms of the derived
benefit, not the existence of an obligation, thereby rendering the distinc-
tion between a business charitable contribution and a business expense
somewhat indistinguishable. '4
" The court in Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967),
listed some of these as "community goodwill, the desire to avoid community bad will, public
pressures of other kinds, tax avoidance, prestige, [and] conscience solving ...."
Id. at 146. The derivation of some economic benefit also appears to fall in this "gray" area.
Given the language of the congressional comment, see sources cited supra note 65, there
seems to be no statutory prohibition on a corporation receiving some economic benefit
from a charitable contribution as long as it is not commensurate with the value of the
transferred interest. See infra note 142.
49 T.C. 695 (1968).
Id. at 696.
Id. at 700.
70 Id.
"1 Id. at 701. The court stated, "neither the statutes, the legislative history, nor the
government's regulations require the existence of a binding obligation ... as a precondi-
tion to deductibility [under S 162(a)]."
1, Cf. Hartless Linen Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1026 (1959); United States Potash
Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1071 (1958); McDonald Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 189 (1951) (5 162(b) limitation applied where no benefits or only tangential benefits
accrued to corporation).
71 Marquis, 49 T.C. at 702.
71 Id. In reaching its conclusion the court expressly refused to apply either the govern-
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In Singer Co. v. United States 5 the Court of Claims also refused to
formulate an inflexible distinction between a business deduction and a
charitable contribution.78 In Singer, the corporation made bargain sales
of sewing machines to certain charitable groups, some of which were public
and parochial schools." Contending that the school discounts represented
charitable contributions, the corporate taxpayer argued that voluntary
contributions were governed exclusively by section 170.8 Consequently,
Singer proposed that the only time a contribution could qualify as a
business deduction for purposes of section 162, was when there was
evidence of a "specific and direct quid pro quo flowing from the transfer."79
In reaching its decision, the Court of Claims rejected the proposition
that section 170 was the controlling statutory provision for all voluntary
and gratuitous transfers to charities, concluding instead that conceivably
a transfer to a charitable organization could be deductible under section
162(a) as a legitimate business expense." In so deciding, the Singer court,
as did the court in Marquis, indicated that the proper focus was on the
nature of the benefit received by the corporation by virtue of the transfer,
not the form of the transfer.2
The holdings in Singer and Marquis, taken together, demonstrate that
a voluntary and gratuitous contribution or transfer may sometimes
constitute business expenditure for purposes of the Tax Code, despite
the absence of an expectation of some commensurate benefit.' Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, the nature of the business expense and the business-
ment's rigid binding obligation analysis or the narrow "detached and disinterested" criteria
set forth in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Marquis, 49 T.C. at 702; see
infra text accompanying notes 84-111 (discussion of the Duberstein criteria). The Marquis
court did not, however, seek to establish an alternative standard. The court did indicate,
though, that factors such as the recurring or nonrecurring nature of the contributions and
the total number of recipients were relevant. See id. at 701 n.6, 703 n.8.
75 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
71 Id. at 420.
' The public and parochial schools receiving discounts were schools and colleges under
federal, state, county, municipal, and parochial administration. The other charities included
government and nonprofit hospitals, government agencies (federal, state, county, and
municipal), the Red Cross, salaried county home-demonstration agents, 4-H Girls Club leaders,
churches, and other charitable organizations. All of these groups received 45% discounts,
except the churches and charitable organizations, which received 25%. Id. at 415.
"' Id. at 419. The corporation's argument, interestingly, is similar to the argument the
government raised in Marquis, 49 T.C. 695 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
Singer, 449 F.2d at 419.
" Id. at 421. ("[Wle ... reject [the company's] first argument that section 170 has ex-
clusive control over all voluntary and gratuitous transfers to charities.") (emphasis in original).
" The court did not decide whether this particular transfer by Singer would constitute
a legitimate business deduction because Singer did not claim a business deduction on their
corporate return. Id. at 421 n.10.
8 Id. at 423. Thus, even if the derived benefit did not originate or flow directly from
the designated transferee, that benefit would be subject to judicial scrutiny under a 5 170
analysis.
See Singer, 449 F.2d at 423; Marquis, 49 T.C. at 702.
[Vol. 58:161
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
oriented charitable contribution will inevitably merge somewhat in the
courts' analysis, with the distinction ultimately resting on the magnitude
of the benefit conferred, not on the presence or absence of a corporate
benefit.
CORPORATE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS
The Duberstein Criteria
As indicated above, the courts' mode of analysis in business charitable
contribution cases has varied from decision to decision," with no one case
being consistently cited as controlling precedent.' The confusion generated
by the courts' inconsistency is exasperating in its own right, but in an
era where the charitable role of the corporation and other business en-
tities is being encouraged and expanded,"8 such a state of affairs is par-
ticularly egregious. More importantly, the analysis most often employed
by the courts, the so-called Duberstein criteria, is entirely inappropriate.
The current difficulties with the courts' analysis of business charitable
contributions may be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in
Commissioner v. Duberstein,87 a case involving a corporation's gift to the
widow of a past employee. The Court held that for purposes of section
102(a),88 the transferor's intent or state of mind was the critical factor. 9
A valid legal gift was said to be a voluntary transfer stemming from
"detached and disinterested generosity" or "out of affection, respect, ad-
miration, charity or like impulses."9
Because section 170 defines a charitable transfer as a "contribution or
gift" many courts have applied the Duberstein criteria when determining
the validity of a claimed charitable contribution. 1 In the leading case of
DeJong v. Commissioner, 11 the Ninth Circuit expressly held that the term
"charitable contribution" was synonomous with the word "gift,"93 and
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
This has been particularly true in the tax courts. See infra note 135.
See supra note 4.
7 363 U.S. 278 (1960). See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (W.). Mich. 1978).
I.R.C. 5 102(a) (1976).
Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285-86. But see Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090
n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1978) ("It is not clear that Duberstein focused solely on motive or state
of mind in assessing whether a transaction was properly characterized as a gift.").
Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285; see also Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956);
Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
91 See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 376-79. The court cites Channing v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1933),
as authority for equating a gift with a charitable contribution. In Channing, the court had
quoted the sponsor of the Senate amendment permitting individuals to take a charitable
deduction as saying, "[wie are now going to exempt . . . gifts to charitable, educational
and scientific institutions .... " 55 CONG. REc. 6730 (1928) (emphasis added).
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analyzed the claimed charitable deduction under the Duberstein test."
Relying on DeJong's authority, courts have become accustomed to
equating a charitable contribution with a gift, 5 so much so that for some
courts, the two terms seem conceptually inseparable."
Those judicial opinions which have disagreed with DeJong's reliance
on the traditional gift test in the area of corporate charitable contribu-
tions, however, are analytically preferable and historically correct."
Neither of the formulative cases in the area of corporate charity, A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow98 and Union Pacific Railroad v. Trustess, Inc.,99
discarded the language of benefit in the process of validating corporate
charitable contributions. ' Implicit in those courts' acknowledgment of
the propriety and desirability of corporate charitable donations was the
notion that these transfers or expenditures benefited the business in some
manner. Thus, while both the New Jersey and Utah Supreme Courts ex-
panded the definition and character of a corporate benefit, neither removed
the need for some form of business benefit from the analysis of the pro-
' DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379.
" See, e.g., Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977); Considine v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 955 (1980); Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 681 (1977); Sutton v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 239 (1971); Wolfe v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970).
" See, e.g., Dowell, 553 F.2d at 1238, where the court makes the analytical leap from
charitable contribution to gift in a perfunctory fashion: "[Section] 170(a) ... allows a deduc-
tion for 'charitable contributions.' It is firmly established that a gift is .... ") (emphasis
added). The fact that the congressional policies behind the enactment of 5 102(a) and S
170 are significantly dissimilar, however, would seem to indicate that a court's analysis
under the two sections should not be identical. This is especially true with respect to the
element of intent. See infra note 132.
" As early as 1961, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected in unequivocal
language the application of the Duberstein test in the context of corporate distributions
or transfers. Joshel v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 645, 647-48 (10th Cir. 1961). The court stated
that "it is difficult to understand how a corporation for profit can transfer property out
of a detached and disinterested generosity .. " Id.
Two cases decided subsequent to Joshel have expressly recognized that some business
benefit does not invalidate, and in fact may be necessary to, a corporation's charitable
transfer. In Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C.
1965), the court found nothing in the IRS Code to prohibit a charitable contribution. Id.
at 904. In fact, the court suggested that it was only proper that a corporation have some
business purpose or extract some type of benefit from the transfer so as to be able tojustify the contribution to its shareholders. Id.; see infra note 151. The Ninth Circuit's
language, rejecting use of the Duberstein criteria in United States v. Transamerica Corp.,
392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968), was even more emphatic. Distinguishing its earlier decision
in DeJong because that case involved an individual taxpayer, the court recognized that
a strict requirement of detached and disinterested generosity or lack of any business pur-
pose would essentially render ultra vires every corporate charitable contribution. United
States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d at 524. This in turn would frustrate the congres-
sional intent that corporations receive such deductions. Id. Cf. United States v. Tsanas,
572 F.2d 340, 347 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978) (court rejects the reasoning of Joshel and Transamerica,
noting that Duberstein involved a transfer by a corporation).
98 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1955).
, See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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priety of corporate gifts. 1 ' As such, it seems that corporate charitable
contributions for those two courts were by definition self-interested con-
tributions made in expectation of some return benefit. They were not
disinterested donations.
The analysis employed by the courts in Marquis v. Commissioner"' and
Singer Co. v. United States"' lend additional support to the view that the
detached and disinterested test of Duberstein is inappropriate in business
charitable contribution cases.' The courts' reasoning in both cases seems
to anticipate some overlap, both as to function and form, between business
expenditures and charitable contributions.",' One implication of such a view
is the possibility that although charitable contributions and legitimate
business expenditures represent different types of corporate distributions,
both are made with the expectation of some benefit accruing to the
corporation."8 To acknowledge that a corporation may expect a benefit
from a charitable contribution is tantamount to rejecting the notion that
a business entity must approach a charitable transfer in a detached and
disinterested fashion.
Viewed in conjunction with past legislative and judicial development, °7
the proper result is reached by those courts that have refused to apply
the Duberstein criteria in the area of business charitable contributions.
The concept of a detached and disinterested transfer is simply misplaced
in the context of business transfers, both historically and from a
shareholder's viewpoint.1" Much of the present confusion in this area of
legal analysis would be eliminated by a formal rejection of Duberstein
and its progeny in business charitable contribution cases.
"I Id. Indeed, the history of corporate contributions may be understood as involving
the continuous expansion of the definition of a legitimate business benefit. See supra text
accompanying note 53. From the strict, charter-related analysis used in the early cases,
see supra note 23 and accompanying text, the concept of benefit eventually grew into the
broad "insuring and strengthening" criteria utilized in A.P. Smith, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d
581. See supra note 45.
10 49 T.C. 695 (1968).
11 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
I" In fact, both courts refused to endorse the Duberstein criteria in their holdings. See
Singer, 449 F.2d at 422; Marquis, 49 T.C. at 702.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. In fact, the Singer court expressly stated
that "we do not contend that absolutely no benefits can be derived from an otherwise
charitable contribution or gift." Singer, 449 F.2d at 423. The Marquis court made no such
express statement, but its holding did not preclude this conclusion. See supra note 74.
"0 Only two cases have expressly acknowledged that a contribution by a corporation
or other business entity should be made with some expectation of a benefit. See United
States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank
of S.C. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900, 904 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
10 See generally supra text accompanying notes 24-84.
108 Other than the two Delaware cases of Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878
(Del. 1969), and Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969), there
has been little recent activity in the area of direct shareholder challenge to a corporation's
charitable expenditures in spite of predictions to the contrary. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra
note 13, at 168.
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A judicial standard that recognizes the propriety and acceptability of
some benefit flowing to the corporation is even more desirable in light
of the express congressional policy of encouraging increases in corporate
charitable contributions, manifested in the newly amended sections 170(b)
(2) and 170(e)(4)." 9 The management decision to make additional
contributions, however, will remain a business decision based to a large
extent on the benefits the corporation may expect in return for its
transfer.110 If the courts continue to apply Duberstein and refuse to allow
some corporate economic benefit to result from the transfer, then the
judicial standard will act as a disincentive to corporate contributions and
effectively frustrate the congressional purpose in amending the IRS
Code."'
Alternative Methods of Analysis:
Transamerica & Singer
The inquiry into what standards courts should apply in business
charitable contribution cases should not end with a rejection of Duberstein.
Having postulated that a business should be able to make a charitable
contribution with the expectation of receiving some benefit in return, the
question then becomes the extent to which a corporation or other business
entity may enjoy a benefit before the contribution loses its charitable
character. The receipt of a commensurate benefit by the transferor has
been held sufficient for a court to deny a charitable deduction.1 2 In such
situations, the transferor is said to have received a quid pro quo suffi-
cient to nullify the charitable deduction,"' or to have made the transfer
for consideration."' Conversely, when the corporation has received no
benefit from the transfer, courts have routinely held the transfer to be
charitable. Since the corporation received no benefit at all, the transfer
is unobjectionable, even under a standard of detached and disinterested
transfers,"' provided all other requirements are met.
Between these two situations of commensurate benefit and no benefit,
there remain myriad gray-area transfers where both the transferring
corporation and the transferee are benefited to some extent. The distinc-
' See supra note 4.
1 See supra note 16.
" See infra note 151.
112 See, e.g., Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975); Grinslade v. Com-
missioner, 59 T.C. 566, 577 (1973).
1 See United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968).
See, e.g., Dockery v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 78,063 (1978); Wolfe v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970).
"I If there is no benefit accruing to the corporation, then there is no evidentiary or
factual basis to claim that the contribution was made with less than disinterested intent.
See, e.g., Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 1975); Stubbs v. United
States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970).
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tions between such transfers lie in the magnitude of the benefit received
by each party. It is in this intermediate area, where gratuity and benefit
are intertwined, that the policy concern over what standard to apply to
business contributions becomes critically important and analytically
difficult. Ultimately, the questions that the courts must resolve are how
much benefit a corporation may enjoy and whether that benefit may be
direct and economic in nature.
The courts that have undertaken the difficult task of reformulating the
legal standard to be used in business charitable contribution cases rely
on an analysis that focuses on the distinction between an incidental and
a direct benefit.116 The first court to utilize this distinction was the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Transamerica, Corp.."7
Although the court refused to allow the claimed charitable deduction, it
did seek to distinguish between a permissible and impermissible benefit."'
The court indicated that a contribution would not lose its charitable status
if the corporation only realized some indirect business benefit, such as
one incidental to public use of the donated property or public recognition
of its act of generosity. If, however, the corporation receives some type
of direct economic benefit, "a quid pro qao... the securing of which was
the sole purpose of its transfer," then the contribution would not be eligi-
ble for deduction under section 170.119 Thus, although the court also con-
trasted economic with noneconomic benefits, the court's primary concern
was insuring that any derived corporate benefit was a mere incident to
the public benefit conferred by the transfer.2
Three years later in Singer Co. v. United States,"2 the Court of Claims
fashioned and applied, ostensibly, a different test. Apparently wishing
to avoid a rigid and unnecessarily restrictive standard,"' the court held:
If the benefits received, or expected to be received, are substantial,
and meaning by that, benefits greater than those that inure to the
general public from transfers for charitable purposes (which benefits
are merely incidental to the transfer), then in such case we feel the
I Aside from the courts' analysis in United States v. Transamerica Corp, 392 F.2d 522
(9th Cir. 1968, Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C. 1965);
and Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971), there has been little judicial
discussion of these questions outside of the Tax Court.
"7 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968).
"' Id. at 524.
11' Id.
It is not clear, however, whether the court felt any economic benefit to the corpora-
tion would prohibit deduction, or whether it was only those economic benefits that con-
stituted a quid pro quo that were fatal. By equating the quid pro quo in this case with
a derived economic benefit which was the sole reason for the corporation entering the trans-
action, id. at 524, the court seems to leave open the question of whether any economic
benefit is sufficient to constitute a quid pro quo, or whether an economic benefit is suffi-
cient to deny deductibility only if it provides the impetus for the transfer.
121 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
" See id. at 422-23.
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transferor has received, or expects to receive, a quid pro quo suffi-
cient to remove the transfer from the realm of deductibility under
section 170.11
The court's standard clearly recognizes that a business may derive some
type of benefit from a charitable transfer."4 That benefit, however, must
be incidental in nature and balanced against the benefit inurring to the
relevant public beneficiary. While the language of the Singer test appears
to be more responsive to the nature of corporate charitable activity than
the Transamerica test," the court's narrow application of its own standard
indicates an unwillingness to fully liberate the analysis of corporate
charitable contributions from the unrealistic and unwarranted restrictions
inherent in the Duberstein criteria.
As noted above,"8 the court in Singer refused to allow a charitable
deduction for Singer's bargain sales of sewing machines to public and
parochial schools, while at the same time approving the deductions claimed
for similar sales to other charities. With respect to the public and parochial
schools, the court denied the charitable deductions on the basis of its belief
that Singer had made the contributions in the expectation of being
benefited by future increased sales. Remarkably, the court reached this
conclusion despite a showing by Singer that, at most, only 1.75% of its
retail customers bought Singer machines because of their use during
previous school training." The court's finding that the bargain sales were
made with the expectation of future increased sales, therefore, was not
readily apparent from the facts before the court. In justifying its holding,
the court stated that Singer's expectation of future sales, "even though
perhaps not fully realized, provided a quid pro quo for those discounts
which was substantial."'28
The court contrasted these denied contributions with those made to
charities other than the schools.1" As to the latter contributions, the court
endorsed the Commissioner's findings that the benefits flowing to Singer
by virtue of those transfers were only "incidental," and that it was dif-
ficult to see how Singer "could derive substantial benefits ... in the way
of increased sales." ''3 Accordingly, those deductions were permitted.
One can only speculate as to how the court was able to separate the
multifarious motivations and considerations underlying Singer's decision
to make bargain sales to the schools from those underlying the decision
to make sales to the other charities. Indeed, the fact that the court's at-
12 Id. at 423.
124 Id.; see supra note 105.
" See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 77.
' Singer, 449 F.2d at 424.128 Id.
2 See supra note 77.
... Singer, 449 F.2d at 424.
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tention focused exclusively on whether the benefits were incidental in-
dicates an overwhelming concern about the subjective intent of the cor-
poration at the moment of the transfer-a concern all too reminiscent
of the Duberstein criteria.131 Surely such an approach is misplaced. As
the First Circuit noted long ago: "If the policy of the income tax laws
favoring charitable contributions is to be effectively carried out, there
is good reason to avoid unnecessary intrusions of subjective judgments
as to what prompts the financial support of the organized but non-
governmental good works of society."'"
The unfortunate consequence of the Singer court's preoccupation with
the corporation's intent is that the court never really undertakes a
"' The Duberstein standard, after all, was premised on the idea that only those contribu-
tions motivated by disinterested generosity were deductible. The Singer court, with its
concern for the predominant motive of the transferring corporation, only partially liberates
the corporate charitable analysis from the quagmire of an intent-based inquiry. See infra
note 132.
" Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1967). See
also Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (WD. Mich. 1978) ("In enacting section
170 it is clear that Congress was not attempting to encourage beneficient states of mind
among taxpayers.") The Crosby court made this statement based upon their conclusion that
"the law's policy finds charity in the purposes and work of the qualifying organization,
not in the subjective intent of the contributor." Crosby Valve, 380 F.2d at 147.
Indeed, the congressional objective underlying S 170 was not simply to permit charitable
contributions, but rather to encourage them. See Comment, Disinterested Generosity: An
Emerging Criteria Under Section 170, 1968 UTAH L. RaV. 475,479 (1968). This policy was,
and continues to be, premised on the theory that by exempting money or property devoted
to charitable causes from taxation, "the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue
by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropria-
tions from public funds, and the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare"
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1938).
Conversely, while S 102(a) allows an exemption for transfers qualifying as gifts, it is
not the result of a congressional desire to "positively encourage" them. Crosby Valve, 380
F.2d at 147. The gift exemption, then, exists at the sufferance, rather than the behest,
of the government. From this, several courts and commentators have concluded that the
judicial concern with intent in S 102(a) cases is a product of the unfavored status of gifts,
and is therefore inapplicable under a S 170 inquiry. In the corporate context, the rejection
of an intent-based analysis is buttressed by the fact that contributions have historically
been made and justified in terms of corporate self-interest.
Accordingly, it is the charitable transfer's contribution to the social welfare of the com-
munity which should be seen as triggering the deduction provisions of the Code. The Singer
court's failure to recognize this principle in their contribution analysis is, in the end, why
their test is unacceptable. To evaluate a corporate benefit on the basis of whether it is
incidental to some overarching charitable purpose necessarily involves the court in the
very "mare's nest of uncertainty woven of judicial value judgments irrelevant to
eleemosynary reality" the Crosby court warned against. Id. at 146. How could the Singer
court finally know, for instance, that the corporate purpose behind the discounts made
to the charities other than the schools was primarily philanthropic, rather than a desire
to encourage future purchases of their sewing machines? Simply put, it cannot, and even
if it could, it should not matter in light of the 'Ic]ongressional intent to focus on the use
to which an alleged contribution is put, rather than on the state of mind of the transferor."
Haak, 451 F. Supp. at 1091 (emphasis supplied). Cf. Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786,
788 (9th Cir. 1976); Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970) (court in-
quiries into dominant motive or purpose of individual charitable donor).
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balancing of the relative corporate and public benefits evident in the
transfer." The court seems to have reasoned that because bargain sales
to the schools were made with the intent of increasing future sales the
benefit obtained was not incidental and was therefore sufficient to
outweigh any conceivable public benefit. Putting aside the question of
intent, however, it seems implausible to conclude that the corporate benefit
of influencing 1.75% of Singer's retail customers to buy Singer sewing
machines at some future date outweighs the interests of training young
adults in the skill of sewing-a training they might not otherwise
receive-and of saving either the local government or the parents part
of the substantial cost of providing the machines. Manifestly, the court
chose to subjugate the balancing aspect of its standard to the speculative
inquiry of whether the corporation's primary motive was to secure some
future economic benefit.
Ultimately, then, it appears that Singer stands for the same type of
incidental benefit-direct benefit dichotomy that Transamerica represents.
Both courts seem to agree that corporations are able to benefit in at least
some incidental fashion, but a finding that the transfer either was
motivated by the expectation of economic benefit" or actually resulted
in an economic benefit to the corporation would nullify the deduction.
The terms direct and incidental benefit and quid pro quo, however, are
merely conclusory descriptions, reminiscent of Duberstein, which depend
on the court's evaluation of the corporation's dominant motiviation for
making the transfer.3 5
13 Stubbs, 428 F.2d at 887. No decision other than Dockery v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
(P-H) 78,063 (1978), has expressly applied the balancing aspect of the Singer test, and
there the application of the Singer analysis was gratuitous. See infra note 135. One 1976
Revenue Ruling, however, does use language similar to the court in Singer. See Rev. Rul.
76-257, 1976-2 C.B. 52. In that ruling, the IRS stated that no S 170 deduction would be
allowed if the transferor received, or expected to receive, substantial economic benefits
in excess of those that would inure to the general public. Id. But see Rev. Rul. 76-232,
1976-1 C.B. 62 (proper standard was whether transferor receives, or reasonably expects
to receive, a financial benefit commensurate with money or property transferred).
Unfortunately, neither the IRS nor the courts have formally adopted and refined the
type of comparative analysis articulated in Singer and Revenue Ruling 76-257. Courts should
apply a balancing approach in business charitable contribution cases, weighing the relative
benefits which flow to the corporation and the general public by virtue of the transfer.
See infra note 143. Conversely, courts should ignore that aspect of the Singer standard,
and presumably Revenue Ruling 76-257, which focuses on the corporate intent fostering
the contribution.
"3 The court's holding in Transamerica, unlike that in Singer, was limited to transfers
which actually resulted in a corporate benefit. United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392
F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968).
1' Courts that have chosen not to apply the criteria of Duberstein, have often cited the
language of Singer, with approval. The first tax court to cite the Singer test was Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962 (1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, 641
F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1981). The court there cited Singer as authority for the somewhat con-
clusory proposition that a transfer did not qualify under S 170 if the transferring business
had an expectation of receiving something in return as quid pro quo. Id. at 1009. The court
did not attempt to distinguish between permissible and impermissible business benefits,
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TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE STANDARD
Expanding The Singer Analysis
While the analysis adopted by both Singer Co. v. United States3 ' and
United States v. Transamerica Corp.1 17 is more responsive to the nature
of corporate charitable activity than the Commissioner v. Duberstein1
criteria, the implicit requirement that a corporation be only incidentally
or noneconomically benefited from a charitable transfer is still unnecessar-
ily restrictive. '39 As long as a corporation or other transferring business
entity does not receive a benefit commensurate with the value of the in-
nor did it discuss the relative public benefits accruing because of the transfer. The court
concluded that there was a quid pro quo involved, but did not employ the Singer court's
analysis in reaching that determination. Id.
In Dockery v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-H), 78,063, at 322 (1978), the court applied
the full Singer analysis. The court concluded that the taxpayer-partnership received benefits
"which were greater than those received by other members of the public ... and thus
a quid pro quo:' Id. The court did not, however, rely solely on the Singer test to decide
the issue. It also found, independently of its application of Singer, that the business had
received consideration from the city sufficient to deny them a deduction. Id. The fact that
the court felt that a deduction would have been denied under either inquiry casts some
doubt on the weight the Singer test carried in the court's holding. Since a finding of a
transfer for consideration would have been sufficient to nullify any charitable deduction,
the application of Singer appears to have been gratuitous. See supra note 133.
Two years later in Saba v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 446 (1980), the court drew
back from Dockery's endorsement of the Singer standard. In response to plaintiff's argu-
ment that Singer should control the court's analysis, the court stated that in Louisville
& Nashville it had
stopped short of approving the Singer language that equates the receipt or
expected receipt of substantial benefits with 'benefits greater than those which
inure to the general public' ... our sole reference to the Singer case reflects
approval only of the test to which we have subscribed in numerous cases:
that a transfer did not qualify as a charitable contribution under section 170
if such transfer was made with expectation of receiving something in return
as quid pro quo.
Id. at 453. The court did not indicate why it refused to apply the Singer standard, an om-
mission all the more perplexing in light of their belief "that regardless of the test applied"
the transfer did not qualify as a charitable contribution. Id. Furthermore, it is difficult
to see where the court's definition of a charitable contribution as a "voluntary transfer
of property by the donor without the expectation or recognition of legal consideration or
legal rights" finds any support in recent case development. Id. at 452.
The most recently reported case in this area, however, does in fact cite and quote the
Singer language with approval. Clayton v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 670 (Aug. 13,
1981). Without referring to either the Dockery or Saba decisions, the court announced it
would "proceed to apply [the Singer rule] in the instant case." Id. at 711. Whether the
court intended this language to indicate it was limiting its endorsement of Singer to this
particular case is not clear, leaving in doubt what standard the court will apply in future
cases. In short, subsequent cases have done little to develop and clarify the Singer approach.
' 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
,37 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968).
138 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
13 See, e.g., Clayton v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 670 (Aug. 13, 1981), where the
court characterized the issue as whether the transferor "derived any economic benefit from
this . . . transaction[.]' Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
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terest transferred" and the general public is sufficiently benefited,"" there
is no statutory or policy justification for denying a claimed charitable
deduction.' The state of mind or purpose behind the corporate decision
to make the transfer is not relevant to the analysis.
In Singer, for instance, it could not be said that the corporation received
a commensurate return on its bargain sales of sewing machines to the
public and parochial schools, since the machines were sold for nearly one-
half the regular price."' Further, the benefits received by the recipient
140 See supra note 66. Judging whether the value of the benefit received by the corpora-
tion is commensurate with the interest transferred involves the often sticky issue of valua-
tion and the balancing of interests. Valuation is not a new difficulty for the courts, however,
since it has often been the case that a claimed contribution of real property was contingent
upon the court's determination of its real worth. See generally Treas. Reg. 1.170-1(c) (1981).
See, e.g., Knapp King Size Corp. v. United States, 527 F.2d 1392 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Clayton
v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 670 (Aug. 13, 1981); Blake v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1336 (Oct. 1, 1981); Interco, Inc. v. United States, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 80,595 (1980);
Kewanee Eng'g Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 672 (April 18, 1979). Concern over
abuses in valuation by taxpayers led to the inclusion of S 6659 in the Economic Recovery
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. That provision amended I.R.C. S 6653 (1976),
and provided for a graduated tax penalty if an individual, closely held corporation, or per-
sonal service corporation overstates the value of certain property by over 150% of the
amount determined by the IRS to be the correct value. I.R.C. S 6653 (Supp. V 1981).
"' Where the transfer is made directly to a political subdivision or other public donee,
rather than a private charity, courts have held that the transferor must establish that
the transfer actually resulted in a benefit. See Doty v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 587, 590-93
(1974); Markham v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 465, 471-72 (1939); see generally Southern Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 600-05 (1980). The policy behind this requirement
is to prevent corporations from taking a deduction for a transfer of worthless or useless
property.
" In enacting what is now S 162(b), Congress obviously sought to limit somewhat the
business character of corporate charitable contributions. See supra notes 64-65 and accom-
panying text. The distinction between a business expense and a charitable contribution
made in a business context, as noted earlier, seems somewhat artificial. Indeed, one com-
mentator has advocated the repeal of S 162(b) in order that corporations would not be
arbitrarily "deprived of the right to establish that their gifts have a business motivation,
comparable to advertising and public relations expenses." Bittker, The Propriety and Vitality
of a Federal Income Tax Deduction for Private Philanthropy (Dec. 2, 1971) (unpublished
manuscript based on remarks made at Tax Institute Symposium on Impact of Taxes on
Philanthropy, Washington, D.C.), reprinted in M.F. SMITH. supra note 22, at 16. It is Bittker's
contention that judicial doctrine would have been able to keep pace with the changing
social expectations of the corporation if Congress had not intervened in 1938 and passed
what is now S 162(b). Bittker, Charitable Donations, 28 TAx L. REv. 37, 58 (1972). Bittker
also indicates that the S 162(b) limitation on corporate charitable deductions possibly in-
creases the costs to corporations of contributing to causes serving both a business and
social function. Id.
Perhaps, then, the congressional policy objective of increasing corporate charitable con-
tributions would have been enhanced by repealing S 162(b) contemporaneously with the
expansion of the S 170(b)(2) percentage limitation. Given that Congress did not repeal S
162(b), however, the courts must continue to distinguish charitable contributions from
business expenses, and yet develop an analysis which is compatible with the policy of in-
creasing corporate contributions. Allowing a corporation to receive economic benefits under
certain circumstances is an acceptable judicial approach. As long as transfers resulting
in a truly commensurate benefit are denied charitable treatment, the congressional intent
in passing S 162(b) will not be violated. See supra note 65.
"' Singer, 449 F.2d at 422.
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school systems in the form of financial savings and enhanced curriculum
were sufficiently important and useful to the communities to allow the
deduction.' Under these circumstances there was simply no compelling
policy reason for the Court of Claims to deny the deduction, especially
in light of the fact that the only possible financial benefit flowing to the
Singer Corporation was the entirely speculative future sale of other
machines."
The newly expressed congressional policy exacerbates the deficiencies
of the current judicial standards being applied in business charitable con-
tribution cases. Ten percent is such a significant proportion of a corpora-
tion's total income 4 that it seems inconceivable to expect many corpora-
tions to reach that percentage without a reasonable expectation that they
will be entitled to enjoy some significant financial benefit in return. If
the courts continue to apply an analysis which prohibits a charitable deduc-
tion in situations where a corporation contributes with the intent of
increasing future sales,14 7 avoiding the cost of future litigation," 8 or simply
acquiescing to prevailing public sentiment,"' then the policy objective of
increasing corporate charitable activity will be decisively hampered.
Even those situations where a corporate decision is made to increase
the level of charitable contributions without regard to reciprocal economic
benefits,"w it is questionable whether that decision would be able to
" The mere fact that a corporation gratuitously transfers some interest or asset without
receiving a commensurate return benefit is obviously insufficient to justify a charitable
deduction. The critical factor is the nature of the public use to which the transferred in-
terest or asset may be put. See supra note 132. While the resulting benefit to the corpora-
tion may at times be relevant in evaluating the overall significance of the public benefit,
factors such as the public's need for the conferred benefit, the fiscal savings to the state,
local, or county governments by virtue of the transfer, and the desirability of encouraging
similar transfers in the future should be given preeminent consideration.
" Where the cumulative future benefit accruing to the corporation can be clearly ascer-
tained by reference to municipal or federal tax law, however, a court may determine that
by operation of those laws the corporation will receive a commensurate benefit in the future
sufficient to deny a claimed deduction.
14 As noted above, the original five percent figure was thought to be significant in terms
of its proportionate relationship to total corporate income. See supra note 35. Given that
the new amendment doubles that "significant" allowance, it seems safe to say that
shareholders will pay considerable attention to contributions approaching the 10% limit.
As a practical matter, it should be noted that a minority of corporations are currently
giving at the five percent limit. The Conference Board, U.S. Philanthropy (Jan. 1980)
(Economic Road Maps Nos. 1870-71). However, corporate charitable contributions rose 180/0
from 1977 to 1980, and reached record levels in 1979. Id. See generally Borris, In Minnesota,
Business is Part of the Solution, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1981, at 85-93; Moskal, Business
Meets Its Social Responsibility, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr. 20, 1981, at 55-59. See also 127 CONG.
REC. S8352 (daily ed. July 24, 1981) (comments of Sen. Kennedy) ("At the present time, cor-
porate contributions to charity average only about 1.2 percent of corporate income ....
But some corporations are at their limit, so it is appropriate to increase the limit now:').
1 See, e.g., Singer, 449 F.2d at 424.
, See, e.g., Saba v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 446, 454 (1980).
1" See, e.g., United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 523 (9th Cir. 1968).
, See, e.g., Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 681, 688 (1977) (dominant shareholder in a
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withstand a shareholder challenge.' 5' Although there have been few
shareholder-initiated suits challenging a corporation's policy of contribu-
tion in recent years,'" the doubling of the percentage limitation coupled
with increased public demand for corporate contributions" creates the
potential for renewed dispute in this area. If corporate managers are
unable to point to some significant corporate benefit flowing to the
corporation as a result of the increased contributions, a shareholder ac-
tion would pose a severe threat to the continuation of that corporation's
contribution program." The fact that the IRS Code permits charitable
deductions does not appear to be an adequate defense to a shareholder
action, since it has been held that while section 170(b)(2) and other relevant
closely held corporation made large amounts of charitable contributions without claiming
a deduction).
151 Traditionally, the affirmative decision by management to make a charitable contribu-
tion has been protected by the business judgment rule. See Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell,
266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1969); Comment, supra note 23, at 426. The essence of the business
judgment doctrine is that courts are hesitant to substitute their judgment for a reasonable
judgment by corporate management. See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P2d 270,
278 (Alaska 1980). Further, it is assumed that a business objective is reasonable "only if
its accomplishment is intended to serve the corporation's best interest:' Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 107 (1980). Thus, those cases which have
upheld corporate charitable contributions in the face of shareholder disapproval have taken
pains to note that the contributions approved were "reasonable" in amount. See Theodora
Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees,
Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 107, 329 P.2d 398, 402 (1958); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J.
145, 161, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (1953). If, however, a corporation did so under the current judicial
standard disallowing any "direct" economic benefit, a shareholder could potentially raise
vigorous objections to the corporation's charitable policy on the grounds that 10%
represented an unreasonable amount and that this constituted waste, or, in the alternative,
an improper failure to distribute dividends. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc.,
8 Utah 2d 101, 107, 329 P.2d 398, 401; Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 311, 256
N.W.2d 761, 773 (1977). If management were unable to point to a substantial benefit, economic
or otherwise, which would tend to prove a reasonable business purpose, they would lose
the protective mantle of the business judgment rule. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251, 1256-57 (Del. 1980); Gimbel v. Signal Co., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch.), affid, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). See also Arsht,
supra, at 122.
Allowing some direct benefits to accrue to the corporation by virtue of its charitable
transfer would ameliorate this potentially difficult management position. The benefits still
may not be as significant as the shareholders would prefer, but their burden of proving
"unreasonableness" or "unsound" business objective would become far more difficult. Without
the imminent threat of liability resulting from a shareholder suit, corporate directors and
managers will be more receptive to the congressional encouragement to increase their
charitable giving levels. In addition, the important judicial policy of having shareholders
and management resolve what is essentially a business dispute through the proxy machinery,
rather than the courts, would be furthered. See generally Cleveland, The Man With the
Proxy Proposal: Lawrence A. Wein, COLUM., Spring 1981, at 27-30 (shareholder uses proxy
machinery to influence corporation's contribution policy).
15 See supra note 54.
153 See Teltsch, Nonprofit Groups Call on Industry to Replace U.S. Aid, N.Y. Times, July
6, 1981, S A, at 1, col. 1.
"u See supra note 151.
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Code sections provide some guidance in determining whether a transfer
will survive a shareholder challenge, they are not dispositive.1"'
The newly amended IRS Code, then, when viewed in conjunction with
presently employed judicial standards, has placed corporate managers in
an awkward position. On the one hand, they are faced with considerable
congressional and public exhortation to donate an increased percentage
of their total corporate assets to charitable causes." On the other hand,
the duty of care owed to shareholders requires that corporate assets be
used reasonably and in the corporation's best interest.' Courts have con-
sistently held that a corporate officer's paramount duty, when given only
this dichotomous choice, is owed to the shareholders, not to the public."8
Corporate managers will not have to face this unfortunate choice,
however, if the courts are willing to recognize that the receipt of some
incidental economic benefit by a corporation in a charitable transfer is
acceptable. The focus should not be on whether the benefit was economic
or noneconomic, or direct or incidental, but rather on the relative
magnitude of benefit flowing to the corporation. As long as the court deter-
mines that the derived corporate benefit is not financially commensurate
with the value of the transferred interest and that some public interest
has in fact been furthered, then the contribution should be judicially
validated as charitable and deductible under section 170. Under this
analysis, the policies of increasing corporate charitable activity and ade-
quately protecting shareholder interests are vindicated, as is the policy
prohibiting corporations from taking charitable deductions in the face of
a return commensurate benefit.
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court's analysis in Duberstein was extended to sec-
tion 170 charitable contribution cases over two decades ago, the judicial
development in the area of business charitable contributions has been
confusing and overly restrictive. Not only have the courts been unable
to agree upon the standard to be employed in this area, but those stand-
ards which have received primary judicial acceptance, the detached and
disinterested criteria and the distinction between direct economic benefits
and incidental benefits, are not dictated by either the early judicial and
legislative history or the Internal Revenue Code. In fact, early 20th-cen-
1 See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (court
concludes that the test for determining whether a charitable contribution is valid is
"reasonableness," with the Internal Revenue Code playing the role of "a helpful guide").
11 See supra note 4.
157 See supra note 151.
"' See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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tury judicial interpretation validated corporate charity specifically on the
basis of the perceived economic benefit to the corporation. While the defini-
tion of benefit was eventually expanded by the courts to include certain
noneconomic benefits such as goodwill, the definition was never stated
so as to totally exclude all direct economic benefits until the DeJong deci-
sion applied the Duberstein criteria in a charitable context.
The detached and disinterested and incidental benefit standards also
represent a major stumbling block to the Economic Recovery Act's policy
of encouraging increased corporate charitable contributions. If the sec-
tion 170(b)(2) ten-percent provision is to have the desired policy impact,
then courts must expand their analysis to allow some direct economic
benefits to flow to the corporation.
For both historical and policy reasons, then, the courts should reject
Duberstein and expand the Singer analysis in business charitable contribu-
tion cases. The judicial focus should be on the aggregate benefits accruing
to both the corporation and the general public, not the type of benefit
realized. If the courts refuse to expand their analysis to include any direct
economic benefits, then the policy of encouraging greater corporate
charitable activity will be frustrated.
KENNETH J. YERKES
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